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Roman Sheremeta, Timothy Shields
The George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics
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Abstract
We design an experiment to study individual behavior in a strategic information setting where the sender has economic
incentives to deceive and the receiver has economic incentives to avoid deception. To ascertain whether subjects
in the role of receiver glean information content from the sender’s message, we elicit choices from risky gambles
constructed to be mathematically equivalent to the information setting if the sender’s message lacks information
content. In the experiment subjects act simultaneously as a sender and receiver in a one-shot interaction. The findings
of our experiment indicate that (i) subjects tend to act deceptively as senders but trusting as receivers, and (ii) as
receivers, subjects glean information content from the senders’ messages. Thus, we find investors (receivers) trust and
investment cannot be rationalized solely by subjects’ attitudes towards risk.
Key words: experiment, level-k thinking, strategic communication, risk preference, beliefs

1. Introduction

“Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first
we practice to believe.” – Laurence J. Peter,
misquoting Sir Walter Scott

In standard equilibria, predictions are constructed assuming that individuals entertain beliefs of others’
strategies by analyzing what others might do and adopting rational strategies in response. In an information
transmission setting with a conflict of interest between
the sender and receiver, the sender’s desire to misrepresent his or her information is anticipated in equilibrium
by the receiver. Accordingly, the sender does not convey all information, but the receiver cannot be described
as misled, as the receiver has unraveled the sender’s intensions to misrepresent information.

Email addresses: sheremet@chapman.edu (Roman
Sheremeta), shields@chapman.edu (Timothy Shields)
1 We would like to thank Glenn Pfeiffer and Jack Stecher for their
suggestions, our colleagues at the Argyros School of Business and
Economics for their helpful comments, and Chapman University for
its support.
Preprint submitted to elicit feedback

As the equilibrium theory of Crawford and Sobel (1982)
predicts, when the preferences of the sender and receiver diverge, not all information is transmitted. However, while experimental senders do adopt deceptive
transmission strategies, the senders transmit more information concerning the true state of nature than equilibria predict. Likewise, receivers rely more on the
senders’ messages than would be expected based on theoretical predictions (Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz, 2009;
Kawagoe and Takizawa, 2008).
Research in the area of financial markets has provided
empirical evidence that financial analysts exaggerate
recommendations. Michaely and Womack (1999) attribute this documented bias to conflicts of interest between the analysts and investors, citing both brokerage
commissions and the investment banking business as
possible sources. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007)
and Franco et al (2007) find evidence of differences in
the reaction of investors, suggesting that some investors
are misled by deceptive recommendations despite the
disclosure of conflicts of interests.
In summary, both empirical and experimental evidence
suggests that while senders tend to adopt deceptive pracNovember 6, 2010

tices, receivers act on information sent as if they, in
some sense, trust senders’ messages. It is important,
however, that any interpretation of behavior is a joint assumption upon the subjects’ risk neutral preferences and
beliefs of others strategies. In this work, we design an
experiment to determine if receivers attempt to glean information content from senders’ messages or are simply
abiding by risk preferences. In the experiment subjects
act simultaneously as a sender and receiver in a oneshot interaction of an information transmission game.
We elicit choices from risky gambles constructed to be
mathematically equivalent to the information setting if
the sender’s message lacks information content. The
two main findings are that (i) subjects tend to act deceptively as senders but trusting as receivers, and (ii) as
receivers, subjects glean information content from the
senders messages.

anticipating deception will be skeptical of the message
and invest only if inequality (1) is true:

U(πA ) U(πB )
+
≥ U(η)
2
2

(1)

2.2. Conditions and Parameters

Holding πB and η fixed, we manipulate πA over four
conditions such that equation (1) is true in half of the
conditions if the subject is risk neutral, i.e. U 00 (.) = 0.
This yields four elicited choices where we can ascertain whether equation (1) is true for each subject in each
condition. Specifically, we set the receiver’s endowment
η = 10, the unfavorable state-based payoff πB = 0, and
the senders compensation λ = 13 in all four conditions.
We set the favorable state-based payoff πA to 12, 18, 22,
or 28 in four conditions, labeled condition 1 through 4,
respectively, shown in Table 1.

2. Theoretical Model and Experimental Design

2.1. The Model
The experimental design is based on a sender-receiver
information transmission game. The game proceeds as
follows. In the first stage, the sender receives a private perfect signal θ ∈ {A, B} about the true state of nature. It is public knowledge that the state of the nature
is equally likely to be favorable (i.e., A) or unfavorable
(i.e., B).

Table 1: Parameter Values for Conditions

Endowment Investment Payoff
η
πB
πA
Condition 1
10
0
12
Condition 2
10
0
18
Condition 3
10
0
22
Condition 4
10
0
28
All payoffs reported in US $.

In the second stage, the sender releases a public message
θ̂ ∈ {A, B} regarding the state, after receiving a private
signal θ . After receiving the message θ̂ the receiver can
invest his cash endowment η, in which case he receives
π(θ ) ∈ {πA , πB }. The investment pays πB < η when θ
is B, and πA > η when θ is A. If the receiver decides
not to invest he retains his endowment. The sender earns
compensation λ > 0 if the receiver decides to invest, or
else receives nothing.

2.3. Attitudes towards risk

The main assumption behind the standard equilibrium
predictions is that subjects are risk-neutral. We elicit
subjects’ risk preferences from a set of four gambles as
in Table 2. Assuming there is no information content
in the sender’s message, the gambles are equivalent to
the four conditions of the sender-receiver game reported
in Table 1. In each gamble, subjects are asked to state
whether they prefer a safe option (equivalent to η) with
probability one, or a risky option where the probability
of the high value (equivalent to πA ) and the low value
(equivalent to πB ) are both one-half.

In the last stage, the true state of nature is revealed and
both players receive their payoffs based on the state and
depending on the investment decision of the receiver.
Utility functions are represented by U(.) where U 0 (.) >
0. As per rational exceptions prediction, a ‘babbling
equilibrium’ should occur where the sender’s report
contains no information content. As such, the receiver
2

2. Each subject simultaneously played both roles of
sender and receiver in all four settings, by choosing what message to send for each possible private signal and whether to invest for each possible
sender’s message. That is, for both values of the
private signal, the sender made a binary choice to
reveal the signal truthfully or not. For each possible message, the receiver made a binary choice
either not to invest (labeled ‘Stay’) or to invest (labeled ‘Go’). Consequently the subject was randomly and anonymously paired with other subjects. The computer randomly selected the setting, the role for payment and the state of nature,
and presented an outcome screen to each individual subject. However, the outcome screen was not
presented until the very end of the experiment, after all parts of the experiment were completed.
3. Then all subjects were asked to choose gambles in
a task designed to elicit risk attitudes, using the
method described in section 2.3. Subjects were
not aware of this task until after we elicited their
choices from the preceding step. One of the four
choices was randomly selected for payment.
4. Each subject was paid a $7 participation fee, the
payoffs from one scenario and one gamble. Each
participant individually signed and dated a payment receipt form and received payment. On average subjects earned $18 in addition to their participation fee.

Table 2: Elicitation of Risk Preferences

Safe Option

Risky Option
Low Value High Value
Gamble 1
10
0
12
Gamble 2
10
0
18
Gamble 3
10
0
22
Gamble 4
10
0
28
Risky option paid low or high values with equal
probabilities.
All payoffs reported in US $.

2.4. Procedures
The experiment was conducted at Chapman University
at the Economic Science Institute. Subjects were recruited from a standard subject pool consisting primarily of undergraduate students. Subjects interacted with
each other anonymously over a local computer network.
The experiment was programmed and conducted using
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The computers were placed
within individual cubicles in such a way that all subjects could only view their own computer screen. The
subjects acted both in the role of sender and receiver in
four settings where we altered πA . We elicited the subjects decisions using the strategy method for both roles
and the four settings simultaneously.
Each of the three sessions lasted approximately fiftyfive minutes, consisted of 20 to 24 subjects, and were
sequenced as follows:

3. Results

1. An experimenter read the instructions aloud while
each subject followed along with their own copy
of the instructions. The instructions explained the
experimental procedures, payoffs, and information
structures used in the experiment (instruction available in the appendix). While going over the instructions, subjects were asked to write down their
answers to several questions to ensure that they
understood the instructions. Subjects’ answers remained confidential to other subjects. The experimenter reviewed the correct answers privately with
each subject.2 During and after the instructions
were read, subjects were prompted to ask the experimenter in private any questions regarding the
experiment procedures.
2 Subjects

3.1. Descriptive Statistics
We found no significant differences between the three
sessions and thus report the combined results. For all
hypothesis tests, we use the choices for each participant, yielding 64 independent observations. Unless
stated otherwise we perform the Wilcoxon matchedpairs signed-rank test.
In the role of sender 13 of 64 subjects chose to always
reveal their private information regarding the state. As
shown in Figure 1, most subjects reveal the state A, but
report A when the state is B. The practice of deception
is consistent across conditions; we find no significant
differences in senders’ behavior within subjects across
conditions.

on average answered less than one question incorrectly.

3

3.2. Analysis

Figure 1: Senders Choices Over Four Conditions

59

56

56

53

22

21

In order to ascertain whether subjects believe there is
information content in other sender’s report, we compare choices from the risk preference elicitation to the
investment choices. If there is no perceived information
content in the sender’s report, the exercises are identical.
These choices are shown in Figure 3. In all conditions
we find that the number of subjects choosing to invest
when the report is favorable exceeds those choosing the
risky over safe gamble.

19

19

Figure 3: Receivers Investment and Risk Choices
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Reveal state is A
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Reveal state is B

Number of 64 subjects reported.
58

55

50

43

42

In the role of receiver, 60 of 64 subjects chose to invest
in at least one of the four conditions. The aggregate
behavior is shown in Figure 2. Investment conditioned
upon each message is increasing over conditions, from
42 out of 64 when πA = 12 to 58 out of 64 when πA = 28.
The increase is significant a p-value ≤ 0.01

18
4

!1

!2

Invest for message A

42

!1

!2

Invest for message A

22

19

16

12

!3

!4

Choose risky gamble

Comparing investment conditioned upon risk choices,
there are 48 of 64 subjects who chose to invest despite
choosing the safe option in the equivalent gamble, in at
least one condition. Thus it appears that receivers are
inferring information content from senders’ messages.
This interpretation is supported by statistical analysis
comparing each subjects number of risky choices to
the number of investment choices, yielding a p-value
≤ 0.01.

58

55

!3

Number of 64 subjects reported who invest in four
conditions and choose risky option in four gambles.

Figure 2: Receivers Choices Over Four Conditions

50

55

To ascertain whether social norms of honesty and trusting drive behavior, we compare each subjects behavior
across both roles. If the subject chose to always reveal
their private information, the subject was coded as honest, else as deceptive. If they chose to invest when despite choosing the corresponding safe gamble, the subject was coded as trusting, otherwise skeptical. The re-

!4

Invest for message B

Number of 64 subjects reported.
4

Crawford (2003) argues the base behavior in
communication-game is to tell the truth as a sender
and trust messages as a receiver. Consistent with
hierarchical thinking models, we find that some subjects act honestly and trusting analogous to L-0. Half
the subjects are deceptive and trusting analogous to
L-1, which is also the best response to others using
L-0 strategies. Lastly, some subjects are deceptive
and skeptical analogous to L-2, which is the best
response to the majority of others using L-1 strategies.
Only one of 64 subjects appears honest and skeptical.
These findings are consistent with Blume et al (2001),
Kawagoe and Takizawa (2008), and Wang et al (2010).

sults are reported in Figure 4. Only one subject is classified as honest in the role of sender but skeptical in the
role of receiver; this subject always chose the risky gamble. A majority of subjects are classified as deceptive
and trusting.3 The null hypothesis that behavior is consistent (honest and trusting or deceptive and skeptical)
is rejected, at a p-value ≤ 0.01.
Figure 4: Subject Behavior Over Both Roles

Honest

15

12

36

4. Conclusion

We designed an experiment to study individual behavior in a strategic information setting where the sender
has economic incentives to deceive and the receiver has
economic incentives to avoid deception. To ascertain
whether subjects in the role of receiver gleaned information content from the sender’s message, we elicited
choices from risky gambles constructed to be mathematically equivalent to the information setting if the
sender’s message lacks information content. In the experiment subjects acted simultaneously as a sender and
receiver in a one-shot interaction. We find that subjects tend to act deceptively as senders but trusting as
receivers. However, as receivers, subjects glean information content from senders’ messages. Finally, a majority of subjects in the role of receiver do not play a best
response to their own behavior in the role of sender.

Trusting

Receiver Action

Skeptical

1

Deceptive

Sender Message
Number of subjects reported.

3.3. Discussion
What framework might predict why a subject in one role
acts deceptively, but that same subject in another role
trusts? Theories based on hierarchical thinking, commonly labeled level-k thinking, posit that subjects behave strategically according to their beliefs of others’
strategic behavior (Stahl and Wilson, 1994). Hierarchical thinking models define subjects by type, where each
type represents the subject’s belief of others’ strategies.
By first setting beliefs of a L-0 type, each successive
type is modeled as playing the rational best response
given that others are lesser types. By construction, L-1
best responds to L-0, L-2 best responds to a mixture of
L-1 and L-0, and so forth.
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other participants, but into separate groupings. There
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These settings are separate, as your decisions in one setting or role will not affect what happens in the other settings.
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You will never be told whom you are paired with. You
are not allowed to communicate with others during the
experiment.

Overview of the Setting

A. Instructions

Each Receiver has one unit of the financial asset. At the
end of each round, the computer determines the State of
the economy, which in turn dictates the value of each
Receivers asset. The chances of a particular State are:

This is a computerized experiment in the economics of
decision-making. By following the instructions carefully and making good decisions, you may earn an additional amount of money besides the show up bonus of
$7. The currency used in this experiment is US dollars.
The actual amount of additional money that you may
earn will depend on your decisions and the decisions of
other participants. Your money will be paid to you in
cash after the experiment ends.

Table A.1: Chances of States

State
Chance of State

A
1/2

B
1/2

The State will be either A or B. There is an equal chance
that the computer will select A or B. So, on average the
computer will select A 50 percent of the time and B 50
percent of the time.

There are some rules you must follow:
1. Do not talk to others at any time during the experiment.
2. You will use your computer to select decisions during the experiment. Do not use your mouse or keyboard to play around with the software running on
your computer. If you unintentionally or intentionally close the software program running on your
computer, you will be asked to leave. If this happens, you will receive only your show up bonus.
3. If you have any questions during the experiment
or instructions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to your location and answer your
questions.

At the beginning of each round the Sender privately
learns the State. No one else learns the State before the
end of the round.
After the Sender learns the State, the Sender sends a Report to the Receiver. After the Receiver sees the Senders
Report, the Receiver decides to Go or Stay resulting in
the following payoffs.
Table A.2: Payoffs Given State and Receiver’s Decisions

State is
Receiver decides to Go
Receiver
Sender
Receiver decides to Stay
Receiver
Sender

Details of the Experiment
Grouping of Participants
The experiment consists of a single round. Within this
round you will be randomly paired with up to eight
6

A

B

X
13

0
13

10
0

10
0

The value of X depends upon the setting. It will either
be 12, 18, 22, or 28.

State were equal to A, would you report A or B, and
if the State were equal to B, would you report A or B?
Specifically, for each possible State, you need to tell the
computer what Report you will send.

Notice that only when the State is A are the payoffs
higher for all parties when the Receiver decides to Go
rather than to Stay. Also notice that the payoff is higher
for the Sender if the Receiver decides to Go rather then
to Stay in both States A and B. Last, notice that the payoffs do not depend on the Sender’s Report, only on the
State and whether the Receiver decides to Go or Stay.

We want you, as the Sender, to say in advance what you
would do in both of the scenarios. The computer implements the decisions you make once the State is drawn.
Your decision will not affect which State is drawn. Your
decision in the role of Sender will not affect the outcome
of the settings in which you are a Receiver. Your decision will note effect the other settings.

What is the Sender’s Report? If the Sender learns the
State is A, the Sender can decide to report either A or B.
If the Sender learns the State is B, the Sender can decide
to Report A or B.

Receiver’s Decision
We will ask you to make a decision in the role of Receiver in four settings. In each setting the payoff to
the receiver in State A is 12, 18, 22, or 28 if he goes.
Specifically, we will ask you to make a decision about
what you would do for each possible Report the paired
Sender might send before you see the Report. When
the experiment starts you will see the following on your
screen (see figure A).

Questionnaire 1
Below, please write down your answers to the following
questions. If you have a question please raise your hand
and an experimenter will privately answer your question. In a few minutes, an experimenter will review the
correct answers.
1. What is the chance the State will be B? (0, 1/2, 1)
2. If the Sender knows the State is B, what can she
report? (A, B, A or B)
3. If the Receiver knew the State was A, would he or
she be paid more if they Go rather than Stay? (Yes,
No)
4. If the Receiver knew the State was B, would he or
she be paid more if they Go rather than Stay? (Yes,
No)
5. If the Receiver decides to Go, what will the Sender
receive? ($10, $13)

On the right side of the screen you are asked as a Receiver to fill in the two entries for each of four settings.
If the Senders Report were A, do you want to Go or
Stay, and if the Senders Report were B, do you want
to Go or Stay? Although, in the end as a Receiver you
would see only one Report (A or B), we still want you
to tell us what you would do for each possible Report.
Your decision will not affect which Report is sent or
which State drawn. Your decision in the role of Receiver
will not effect the outcome of the settings in which you
are a Sender.

Sender’s Decision
Questionnaire 2
We will ask you to make a decision in the role of Sender
in four settings. In each setting the payoff to the receiver
if he goes in State A is 12, 18, 22, or 28. Specifically, we
will ask you to make a decision about what you would
report to the paired Receiver in advance of seeing the
State drawn. When the experiment starts you will see
the following on your screen (see figure A).

Below, please write down your answers to the following questions. In a few minutes, an experimenter will
review the correct answers.
1. If the Sender elects to report A always, what report
will the Receiver see when the State is A? (A, B)
2. If the Sender elects to report A always, what report
will the Receiver see when the State is B? (A, B)
3. Does the Receiver always have to Go? (Yes, No)

On the left side of the screen you are asked as a Sender
to fill in the two entries for each of four settings. If the
7

Figure A: Input screen used experiment

4. If the Sender’s Report is B, can the State be A?
(Yes, No)
5. If the Sender’s Report is A, can the State be B?
(Yes, No)

Table A.3: Results of the Round

State
Sender’s report
Receiver’s decision
Sender’s payoff
Receiver’s payoff

Results of the Round
caption Senders Report. Note this is the Senders Reportnot the State.

After you make both your decisions, the decision in the
role of Sender and the decision in the role of Receiver,
click on the red Submit button. After all participants
input their decisions, the computer will display the outcome screen with the outcome from one of the six settings. One, and only one, of your settings will be randomly selected and you will be paid on the outcome of
that setting. For example, if the setting in which you
played the role of Receiver was selected for payment,
then your screen would show:

Next, using the decision input by the Receiver, the computer reports if the Receiver decided to Stay or Go for
the given Senders Report. This decision is reported in
the row titled Receivers decision. Finally, the computer
determines the payoffs (taken from Payoffs Given State
and Receivers Decisions table) given the State and the
decisions for the Sender and the Receiver. These payoffs are reported in the last two rows titled Senders payoff and Receivers payoff.

How is this table generated? After all the participants
have input their decisions, the computer will draw realizations of the State independently for each pair. The
computer determines the State randomly as based on
Chances of State table. Given the decision input by the
Sender, the Report is determined and appears under the

To summarize, the experiment consists of a single round
where:
1. Grouping of Participants: pairs are randomly assigned.
8

choices you would make in them. The only right answer
is what you really would choose.

2. Participant’s Decisions: each participant enters
both a decision in the role of Sender and a decision in the role of Receiver.
3. Payoffs: the computer randomly selects one setting
calculates payoffs using the decisions input.
4. Results for the round: each participant sees payoff
from the setting where he/she was the Sender or
from the setting where he/she was the Receiver.

For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total of
4 lines in the table but only one line will be randomly
selected for payment. Each line is equally likely to be
selected, and you do not know which line will be selected when you make your choices. Hence you should
pay attention to the choice you make in every line. After you have completed all your choices the computer
will randomly drawn a number from 1 to 4. The drawn
number determines which line is going to be selected
for payment.

At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in private
and in cash.

Questionnaire 3
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in that line, you
will receive $10. If you chose option B in that line, you
will receive either a positive amount or $0. To illustrate,
say the line drawn for payment is #2. To determine your
earnings another number is randomly drawn from 1 to 2.
The drawn number is then compared with the numbers
in the line selected (see the table). If the drawn number
is 1 you earn $18, but if the drawn number is 2 you earn
$0.

Below, please write down your answers to the following questions. In a few minutes, an experimenter will
review the correct answers
1. You will be paid for one of your settings, not both.
(True/False)
2. Suppose the setting where if the Receiver goes in
State A he or she gets 18. If the State is A, the
Sender reports ‘A’ when the State is A, and the Receiver decides to Go when the Report is ‘A’, what
is:
a. The Sender’s Report? (A, B)
b. The Receiver’s payoff? (0, 10, 18)
c. The Sender’s payoff? (0, 13)
3. Suppose the setting where if the Receiver goes in
State A he or she gets 22. If the State is B, the
Sender reports ‘A’ when the State is B, and Receiver decides to Stay when the Report is ‘A’, what
is:
a. The Sender’s Report? (A, B)
b. The Receiver’s payoff? (0, 10, 22)
c. The Sender’s payoff? (0, 13)

While you have all the information in the table, we ask
you that you input all your choices into the computer.
The actual earnings for this part will be determined at
the end, and will be independent of the prior portions.
Table A.4: Option payoffs

Line
#1
#2
#3
#4

The following portion of instructions was distributed after choices were made in aforementioned settings.

4 Decision Problems
In this part of the experiment you are asked to make a
series of choices in 4 decision problems. How much
you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on
the choices you make. The decision problems are not
designed to test you. What we want to know is what
9

Option A
$10
$10
$10
$10

Option B
$12 if 1 is draw $0 if 2 is drawn
$18 if 1 is draw $0 if 2 is drawn
$22 if 1 is draw $0 if 2 is drawn
$28 if 1 is draw $0 if 2 is drawn
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